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Abstract
The Hicksian definition of complementarity and substitutability may not apply
in contexts in which agents are not utility maximisers or where price or income
variations, whether implicit or explicit, are not available. We look for tools to iden-
tify complementarity and substitutability satisfying the following criteria: they are
behavioural (based only on observable choice data); model-free (valid whether the
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agent is rational or not); and they do not rely on price or income variation. We
uncover a conflict between properties that it is arguably reasonable for a comple-
mentarity notion to possess. We discuss three different possible resolutions of the
conflict.
J.E.L. codes: D0.
Keywords: Complements and substitutes; Correlation; Stochastic choice.
1.1 Motivation
In this paper we take a fresh look at the notion of complementarity. Intuitively, comple-
ments are goods that ‘go together’. However, this can be specified in several different ways
and on the basis of different primitives. Price (or income) variations are just a tool to
detect complementarity: the notion of complementarity itself is not intrinsically related to
such variations. Furthermore, we also take the view that complementarity is meaningful
independently of whether decision makers maximise utility or not. After all, goods may or
may not go together whatever the cognitive process that leads to choice, including bound-
edly rational ones. For example, we would like to be able to talk about complementarity
for a ‘satisficer’ a` la Simon (28) or an ‘eliminator by aspects’ a` la Tversky (30) (who does
not even ‘have’ a utility, let alone maximise it). For these reasons we look for definitions
of complementarity (and substitutability) between goods that complement those of the
standard approach. In sum, we look for a notion that is:
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(1) priceless: it is not based on price (nor income) variations;
(2) behavioural: it just uses choice data as inputs;
(3) model free: it does not commit to any specific mechanism underlying the choice
data.
To motivate this program, suppose that a local government wants to know whether
the uses of two free public attractions, say a museum and a park, ‘go together’. An
economist will translate this question as the question of whether the park and the museum
are complements. However, this situation does not fit directly the textbook criteria for
complementarity, which are based on price elasticities while in this case both prices are
fixed at zero. The authority may also be surprised to hear that the gold standard concept
of Hicksian complementarity is embedded in a rational utility maximisation framework.1
Of course, a well-bred economist could explain to the authority that it is always possi-
ble to retrieve ‘implicit’ prices. One could for instance check the impact of having the park
1It merits noting in this respect that goverments are more and more exposed to the idea that citizens
are not necessarily fully rational utility maximisers. They are increasingly being advised by ’behavioural
economics’ units. These include the US Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, which led to the
institution of the US government’s Social and Behavioral Sciences Team in July 2015; the Behaviour
Insights team in the UK, established in 2010 and then spun off into a separate company in 2014; the
Behavioural Insights Unit established in 2012 as part of the New South Wales Premier and Cabinet’s
office. The German Chancellery is in the process of setting up a similar unit. Several other governmental
units and groups exist in various countries and in the European Union Directorates General.
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located at different distances from the museum, observe the resulting effect on the demand
for the museum, impute a value to the time needed to move between the two attractions,
and then calculate an elasticity based on such values. Because it may be somewhat im-
practical to experiment with moving the park at various distances, the impact would be
estimated from the observations of analogous effects relating to other museums and other
parks, and these effects would be adjusted for the various factors affecting demand in the
different locations. But, while this standard type of methodology has merits2, it is fair to
say that it is very indirect and thus its validity necessarily rests on several assumptions
(regarding the imputed value of time, the comparisons across locations, the specification
of the model that generates demand, etcetera). And the fact remains that Hicksian com-
pensated elasticities are guaranteed to be meaningful only within a constrained utility
maximisation framework.3
Some recent econometric approaches, pioneered by Gentzkow (18), deal with the zero
2A neat early example of the methodology is Becker and Murphy’s (6) analysis of the complementarity
between advertising and advertised goods based on the implicit price of commercials, which are shown on
television without a price. If networks stopped showing commercials, the public would have to pay for
television content. The change in the price of content is the implicit price of commercials.
3In principle, one might be able to perform a Hicksian type of compensation (when price variations are
available) even when the agent is not a utility maximiser, provided there is some obvious way of defining
‘revealed indifference’. This is not always the case. Also, we note that different tests of complementarity
might use income rather than price variations (see Quah (26) and our literature review section 2), but
still in a framework of constrained utility maximisation.
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price problem. They typically assume an additive Random Utility Model (RUM) such
as the multinomial logit and variations thereof (see section 2 for a discussion). However,
the recent wave of abstract works on stochastic choice (e.g. Aguiar, Boccardi and Dean
(1), Brady and Rehbeck (11), Caplin and Dean (13), Echenique, Saito and Tserenjigmid
(17), Gu¨l, Natenzon and Pesendorfer (19), Kovach and U¨lku¨ (21), Manzini and Mariotti
(22), among others) has highlighted a wide variety of possible ‘choice errors’ and choice
procedures, and so a number of reasons why agents’ behaviour might fail to be described
by a logit model, and indeed even by the much larger class of RUMs. We take seriously
the multiplicity of plausible models and the consequent difficulty of model selection.
Zero or hard-to-define prices are observed for many other goods beside public attrac-
tions: online newspapers, reviews/advice (e.g. financial) on social networks, public radio
broadcasts, file sharing are often free. Another leading example is that of complementar-
ity in business practices, such as training the workforce and allowing it more decisional
discretion (Brynjolfson and Milgrom (12)). More abstractly, the ‘goods’ may be character-
istics embodied in the objects of choice, so that any price variation is perfectly correlated
between the goods. In some cases, prices may be especially difficult to conceptualise: is
beauty a complement or a substitute of wealth in a partner? Finally, interest in comple-
mentarity may concern non-market individual activities and behaviours, such as voting
participation in local and national elections.
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1.2 The basic ideas
How can the intuitive concept of goods ‘going together’ be made operational?
The first idea in our analysis is to use stochastic choice data as a primitive. Because we
are not going to exploit responses to price variations, and more in general the variation of
choices across menus, we lose some information compared to the standard approach. To
obviate this, we consider instead a multiplicity of choices from a fixed menu, in the form
of choice frequencies. As in standard stochastic choice models, such frequencies admit
multiple interpretations: they may express repeated individual choices; fractions of time
an individual spends performing an activity or using a durable good; or the proportion of
a population purchasing a good. The rich structure of this type of data is an alternative
source of information about underlying complementarities.
The second idea is to examine two principles that we consider as basic:
a) Statistical Association: Association is exactly what it means to ‘go together’ in
statistical language. Therefore it seems that if choice data come in the form of frequencies
then the consumption of complementary goods should exhibit some kind of statistical
association. Indeed, in the literature about complementarities in business practices, the
positive correlation (or clustering) of practices is the most common complementarity test4.
b) ‘Revealed preference’: Complementarity between goods, unlike natural phenomena
for which ‘going together’ is exhausted by statistical association, has the peculiarity that
4See e.g. Brynjolfson and Milgrom (12), p.33.
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it is the expression of an act of choice. What information do choices convey about com-
plementarity? At the very least it seems that consuming the goods jointly should not in
itself be evidence of substitutability, and consuming the goods individually should not in
itself be evidence of complementarity. Note well: this principle is not saying that joint
consumption per se is evidence of complementarity - there could be complementary goods
whose joint consumption is low.
The revealed preference principle is also fundamental from a welfare perspective. In-
terest in complementarity is often a consequence of a welfare question, such as “is it
welfare enhancing to build a park next to the existing museum?” or “would introducing a
new product be welfare enhancing for the consumers (so that he would be willing to pay
more)?”. We take the classical view that an agent’s choices encode welfare information,
and that, as articulated by Bernheim and Rangel (8), they do so whether the agent is
rational or not. It would be odd indeed if the local authority, having decided that the
construction of the park is in the interest of the community, was dissuaded after learning
that the joint consumption of park and museum in a similar location has increased.
1.3 Preview of results
Consider two goods, say the online and the print versions of a newspaper. As in Gentzkow
(18), the data come in the form (pOP , pO, pP , p∅), where pO and pP denote the consumption
frequency of the online version only and of the print version only, respectively; pOP denotes
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the frequency of joint consumption; and p∅ denotes the frequency with which neither
version is read.
Let’s consider the statistical principle discussed above. For simplicity, let’s also focus in
this section on association as correlation (this is just for concreteness: later on we will use
a much more abstract concept). Then we would say the two versions are complementary
whenever they are positively correlated, that is, when the posterior probability of reading
one version conditional on reading the other version, pOP
pOP+pP
, is greater than the prior
probability, pOP + pO.
It is easily shown, however, that this property flatly contradicts the intuitive revealed
preference view that increases in joint consumption should not by themselves constitute
evidence of substitutability. Consider the data in the following table:
Read Print Did not read print
Read Online 0.3 0.2
Did not read online 0.2 0.3
That is, (pOP , pO, pP , p∅) = (0.3, 0.2, 0.2, 0.3). Then the data indicate a positive correlation
( pOP
pOP+pP
= 0.6 > 0.5 = pOP + pO). Suppose now that joint consumption rises to p
′
OP =
0.55 while single good consumptions stay the same. Then the correlation turns negative
(
p′OP
p′OP+p
′
P
= 0.73 < 0.75 = p′OP + p
′
O). An increase in joint consumption has transformed
the goods from complementary to substitutes!
Our first main contribution is to show that this simple example illustrates a deeper
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conflict between two natural properties that criteria for complementarity should satisfy.
One is monotonicity, embodying the revealed preference principle: an increase in joint
consumption accompanied by (weak) decreases in single good consumption should not
overturn an existing complementarity (and analogously for substitutability).
The second property is duality : if in a dataset O and P are complementary, then they
are substitutes in the ‘opposite’ dataset in which the instances of consumption of P are
switched with the instances of non-consumption of P (holding fixed the consumption/non-
consumption of O). Duality is evidently satisfied by all common measures of correlation
and association. It is intrinsic to the nature of association that ‘inverting’ behaviour
changes the sign of the association.
The conflict in general is somewhat more subtle than in the simple example above. The
two properties do not flatly contradict each other. However, theorem 1 shows that any
concept of complementarity that satisfies monotonicity and duality must be also unrespon-
sive, in the sense that the level of non-consumption p∅ on its own determines whether the
goods are complements or substitutes, irrespective of the distribution between single and
joint consumption. This is a very undesirable feature, and for this reason we interpret the
result as one of conflict between the the statistical association and the revealed preference
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principles.5
We then look for ways out of the impossibility (Section 5), focussing on symmetric
criteria (i.e., such that complementarity, or lack of it, is bidirectional among the two
goods). Correlation turns out to be the only symmetric criterion of complementarity
that satisfies both duality and a modified monotonicity condition, which embodies only a
‘proportional’ version of the revealed preference principle.
Next, we examine monotonic criteria that satisfy modified notions of duality, based on
alternative interpretations of what constitutes the ‘opposite’ of a given behaviour. One
criterion is economically intuitive if the numbers pOP , pO and pP are taken as expressing
the values of the respective options: O and P are complementary (resp., substitutes) if
pOP > pO + pP (resp., pOP < pO + pP ). This criterion satisfies a duality property based
on exchanging joint consumption with total single good consumption.
The third criterion for complementarity to be considered says that O and P are com-
plementary (resp., substitutes) if pOP > max {pO, pP} (resp., pOP < min {pO, pP}). This
criterion satisfies a notion of duality based on exchanging joint consumption with one
type of single good consumption. We consider these as the three main candidate criteria
of model-free stochastic complementarity.
5Furthermore, a second impossibility result (theorem 6) shows that duality and monotonicity are in
outright conflict if it is also assumed that the frontier between complementarity and independence is thin,
as is the case for the standard elasticity-based criteria.
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In the concluding discussion we argue the Hicksian complementarity criterion may not
be always appropriate for the type of data we are considering.
2 Related literature
Samuelson (27) contains an erudite discussion of the subtleties of the concept of comple-
mentarity, with an exhaustive review of the classical literature.
The work by Gentzkow (18) we have already mentioned pioneers the approach to the
zero price problem. He asks the question of whether the online and print versions of a
newspaper are complements or substitutes. The main difficulty to be solved in this case is
that the observed correlation in consumption may partly reflect correlated unobservable
tastes for the goods, rather than ‘true’ complementarity: for instance, a news junkie may
consume both paper and online versions even when there is no ‘true’ complementarity,
which in a model of (random) utility maximisation means a positive difference between
the value of joint consumption and the sum of the values of single good consumptions.6
Gentzkow finds sufficient conditions under which correlation in choice data is indicative
of Hicksian complementarity, and analyses the identification of complementarity (as op-
posed to taste correlation) in the data by using exogenous variations in factors that do
not interact with preferences. This requires the development of an innovative economet-
6As Gentzkow shows, in the two good model this is equivalent to a positive compensated cross price
elasticity of demand.
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ric identification technique which, however, is meaningful only within the random utility
model. Our approach, in contrast, is to investigate whether complementarity or substitu-
tion can be identified in a model-free fashion. Our agents may not even ‘have’ a utility
function.
It is a surprising fact that the full behavioural implications of the classical definitions of
complementarity and substitutability, based on cross price elasticities, have only recently
been uncovered, in two papers by Chambers, Echenique and Shmaya ((14) and (15)). The
key difference between their work and ours is that their hypothetical data include obser-
vations of consumption decisions for different prices (as the classical definition requires),
whereas ours are based on consumption decisions alone.
A large literature exists in which supermodularity of a utility function gives, by def-
inition, a complementarity relationship between the goods, and likewise submodularity
is equivalent to substitutability (see for example Bikhchandani and Mamer (9), Gu¨l and
Stachetti (20) for applications of submodularity and related notions of substitutability in
general equilibrium models with indivisibilities.7) These definitions are cardinal. Comple-
mentarity in the form of supermodularity is also the bread and butter of modern monotone
comparative static techniques as surveyed by Topkis (29). Our approach differs from this
line of work, in that our axiomatic analysis relies on the data, rather than on the underlying
7See Baldwin and Klemperer (5) for an innovative approach (based on tools from tropical geometry)
that yields complements/substitutes types of conditions for the existence of equlibria with discrete goods.
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preference.
Finally, an interesting line of research concerns the relation between a supermodularity-
based notion of complementarity and income (rather than price) variations in constrained
utility maximisation consumer problems. Chipman (16) was the first to prove that the so-
called Auspitz-Lieben-Edgeworth-Pareto notion of complementarity (positive cross partials
of the utility function), together with strong concavity of the utility, implies that all goods
are normal (so that in other words, their demands are correlated if the data is generated
by income variations), and the demand for each goods is a decreasing function of its own
price. Quah (26) provides the modern general theory that implies this insight using the
tools of supermodularity theory.
3 Preliminaries
There are two goods, x and y. A datapoint is an ordered four-tuple p = (pxy, px, py, p∅)
with pk ∈ (0, 1) for k ∈ {xy, x, y,∅} and
∑
k∈{xy,x,y,∅} pk = 1. The interpretation is that
pxy denotes the probability (or frequency) of joint consumption of x and y, px and py denote
the probabilities of consumption of x but not y and of y but not x, respectively, and p∅
denotes the probability of consuming neither x nor y. Let T be the set of datapoints, i.e.,
T =
{
(a, b, c, d) ∈ (0, 1)4 : a+ b+ c+ d = 1} .
Definition 1. A criterion is any triple (C, I, S) where C, I and S are pairwise disjoint
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subsets of T, and C and S are nonempty.
Hence a criterion partitions datapoints into three distinct regions: a complementarity
region C, a substitution region S and an independence region I. If p ∈ C (resp. p ∈ S,
resp. p ∈ I) we say that x and y are complements (resp. substitutes, resp. independent)
at p. We next define some criteria of interest.
Definition 2. A criterion (C, I, S) is the correlation criterion if
C =
{
(pxy, px, py, p∅) ∈ T : pxy
pxy + py
> pxy + px
}
and
S =
{
(pxy, px, py, p∅) ∈ T : pxy
pxy + py
< pxy + px
}
According to the correlation criterion a datapoint is in C (resp., S) if and only if the
information that one of the goods is consumed increases (resp., decreases) the probability
the other good is also consumed.
Definition 3. A criterion (C, I, S) is the additivity criterion if
C = {(pxy, px, py, p∅) ∈ T : pxy > px + py} and
S = {(pxy, px, py, p∅) ∈ T : pxy < px + py} .
The additivity criterion is natural whenever one thinks of the probabilities as expressing
‘values’ (as is the case in the logit model). Then it says that x and y are complements
whenever the value of joint consumption is greater than the sums of the values of the
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goods when consumed singly. This is in fact the notion of complementarity used in many
applications, e.g. the literature on bundling (e.g. Armstrong (4)).
Definition 4. A criterion (C, I, S) is the maxmin criterion if
C = {(pxy, px, py, p∅) ∈ T : pxy > max {px, py}} and
S = {(pxy, px, py, p∅) ∈ T : pxy < min {px, py}}
The maxmin criterion fits, for instance, the situation in which one good is an ‘acces-
sory’ and only the ‘dominant’ single good consumption is relevant in comparison with
joint consumption to declare complementarity. To check whether steak and pepper are
complementary you may want to compare the probability of consumption of steak with
that of steak and pepper, rather than with that of pepper alone. Substitution is declared
symmetrically.
Definition 5. A criterion (C, I, S) is the supermodularity criterion if
C = {(pxy, px, py, p∅) ∈ T : pxy + p∅ > px + py} and
S = {(pxy, px, py, p∅) ∈ T : pxy + p∅ < px + py}
Here the goods are declared complementary if a supermodularity condition on p is
satisfied (with p seen as a function defined on the set of consumption bundles {xy, x, y,∅}).
Supermodularity-type conditions capture complementarity when imposed on an objective
function to be maximised (Topkis (29), Milgrom and Roberts (24), Milgrom and Shannon
(25)). Note that the condition is equivalent to pxy + p∅ >
1
2
.
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For illustration, consider table 1, calculated on the basis of Gentzkow’s (18) data on
5-day readership of the online and print version of the Washington Post:
Read print Did not read print
Read online 0.137 0.043
Did not read online 0.447 0.373
Table 1: Washington Post, 5-day readership of online and print version (Gentzkow (18)).
In this case the above criteria are in deep conflict: the correlation and supermodularity
criteria indicate that the two versions are complementary, the additivity criterion indicates
that they are substitutes, and the maximin criterion indicates that they are independent.
Therefore, in order to assess the different criteria, we propose an axiomatic analysis,
examining the properties that criteria should possess given the interpretation.
4 Impossibilities
In this section we uncover the core conflict between the association and the revealed
preference principle discussed in the introduction. We view duality as a prominent feature
of all association-based definitions of complementarity and substitution:
Duality
1) If (a, b, c, d) ∈ C then (b, a, d, c) ∈ S and (c, d, a, b) ∈ S.
2) If (a, b, c, d) ∈ S then (b, a, d, c) ∈ C and (c, d, a, b) ∈ C.
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Suppose that you have two datapoints p and q. Suppose that, whether x is consumed
or not, y is consumed at q with the same frequency with which it is not consumed at p.
If a datapoint were presented in table form, as in the introduction, q would be obtained
from p by switching the rows. For example, q could be obtained when y is consumed
only in weekends while p is obtained when y is consumed only in weekdays (assuming for
simplicity that y’s consumption pattern is the same whether x is consumed or not). In this
sense q expresses a behaviour that is the ‘opposite’ of the behaviour at p. Then duality
says that x and y are complements at p only if they are substitutes at q, and vice-versa.
The same transition between C and S follows when the columns, rather than the rows,
are switched.
Note that the two duality conditions imply a third one concerning the independence
region, namely that if (a, b, c, d) ∈ I, then (b, a, d, c) ∈ I and (c, d, a, b) ∈ I.
As noted in the introduction, duality is satisfied by all common measures of statistical
association (like risk, relative risk, the odds ratio or the phi coefficient). It is important
to emphasise that any given measure does not necessarily preserve the magnitude of as-
sociation (while changing the sign) when a datapoint is transformed into its opposite in
the sense described above. For example, applying the phi coefficient to the datapoints
(a, b, c, d) and (b, a, d, c) gives, respectively, ad−bc
(a+d)(c+d)(a+c)(b+d)
and bc−ad
(b+c)(c+d)(b+d)(a+c)
which
differ in general in absolute value. The common feature across measures is instead the sign
change of the association following the row or column change in the contingency table,
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and this is precisely what the Duality axiom captures. It is this particular property that
we take to be at the heart of the notion of association.
The revealed preference principle is formalised as follows:
Monotonicity
1) If (a, b, c, d) ∈ C, (a′, b′, c′, d′) ∈ T , a′ ≥ a, b ≥ b′ and c ≥ c′ then (a′, b′, c′, d′) ∈ C.
2) If (a, b, c, d) ∈ S, (a′, b′, c′, d′) ∈ T , a ≥ a′, b′ ≥ b and c′ ≥ c then (a′, b′, c′, d′) ∈ S.
Monotonicity says that, if goods are complements, then an increase in joint consump-
tion without an increase in single consumption cannot transform them into substitutes or
render them independent, and vice-versa.
There do exist criteria that satisfy Duality and Monotonicity: for example, the su-
permodularity criterion above. However, this criterion is highly unsatisfactory, because
it declares the goods complementary at any datapoint for which p∅ >
1
2
, for all possible
values of pxy, px and py. This looks ‘wrong’ on two counts. First, it is desirable that no
individual component of (a, b, c, d), should be decisive by itself to declare either comple-
mentarity or substitutability: the criterion should also respond to variations in the other
components. Secondly, even granting the possibility of one component dictating the cri-
terion, it is hard to justify the fact that it is a high value of p∅ on its own to mandate
complementarity. The following axiom rules out this possibility.
Responsiveness
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a) If (a, b, c, d) ∈ C, then (a′, b′c′, d) 6∈ C for some a′, b′ and c′ which sum up to 1− d.
b) If (a, b, c, d) ∈ S, then (a′, b′c′, d) 6∈ S for some a′, b′ and c′ which sum up to 1− d.
Responsiveness says that keeping the no-consumption frequency constant, some reshuf-
fling of the consumption frequencies should be able to change the judgement of the crite-
rion. The axiom is completely agnostic as to which operations on the first three coordi-
nates of a datapoint should turn complements into non-complements and substitutes into
non-substitutes.8
The supermodularity criterion fails Responsiveness as discussed above. The correla-
tion criterion satisfies Responsiveness. It is also satisfies Duality, but, as noted in the
introduction, it is not monotonic. The additivity criterion satisfies Monotonicity but fails
part (2) of Duality. The maxmin criterion fails Duality.
It turns out that all possible criteria that satisfy Duality and Monotonicity must fail
Responsiveness:
Theorem 1. There exists no criterion that satisfies Monotonicity, Duality and Respon-
siveness.
All proofs are in Appendix A, but the examples given previously show that the im-
possibility result of theorem 1 is tight, as no axiom among the three is implied by the
remaining two.
8In the next section, we will study two axioms in (T,J)-Duality and (S,J)-Duality which specify such
operations.
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The clash between association and monotonicity properties can also be observed from
a different angle. In Appendix C we show that a variation of Monotonicity is also incom-
patible with Duality.
5 Possibilities
While we consider the two general principles (revealed preference and association) as basic
minimal features of the notion of complementarity, we are not asserting that the specific
axioms with which they can be expressed have universal validity. So we take the impossi-
bility results we have obtained only as indicating a general tension between the principles,
not a universal incompatibility. Weaker or different forms of the axioms may not only
resolve the tension, but even be more appropriate in some contexts. For example, we
could require in the Monotonicity axiom that the non-consumption component is held
fixed across the two datapoints being compared. This would ‘neutralise’ (in the popu-
lation interpretation of the data) accidental inclusions or exclusions of datapoints from
individuals who just are not interested in the goods. Only shifts in the behaviour of peo-
ple who actively consume the goods would be relevant for revealed preference. Then, the
correlation criterion would become acceptable, satisfying all properties.
In this spirit, we now turn our attention to three arguably plausible criteria that meet
the desired principles in a qualified or different specification of the axioms.9 The correlation
9These are the only criteria to have been suggested in a random survey of colleagues.
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criterion is obtained by preserving Duality and weakening the monotonicity properties. For
the other two criteria, additivity and maxmin, we instead retain monotonicity but vary
the notion of duality. A duality operation produces the behaviour that is the ‘opposite’
of the one to which the operation is applied. A duality property in our context asserts
that if a datapoint is classified in a certain way, then its dual is classified in the opposite
way. This is an intuitive requirement but, as we will see, there are other reasonable ways
to interpret the concept of ‘opposite’ behaviour beside the one we have considered, hence
other reasonable versions of duality. In Appendix B we also offer a characterisation of
the supermodularity criterion. However, we find this criterion conceptually implausible
because of its lack of responsiveness discussed before.
Before moving on to the characterisations, note the following axiom which is satisfied by
all three criteria of our interest (and, as shown in Appendix D, is implied by Monotonicity
and Duality):
Symmetry:
1) If (a, b, c, d) ∈ C then (a, c, b, d) ∈ C.
2) If (a, b, c, d) ∈ S then (a, c, b, d) ∈ S.
Symmetry says that exchanging the amounts of single good consumptions is immaterial
for the purpose of classifying goods into complementary or substitutes. Samuelson (27)
considers its symmetry as one of the two major improvements of the Slutsky-Hicks-Allen-
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Schultz ‘compensated’ definitions compared to the ‘uncompensated’ one.
Note that, as for Duality, the two Symmetry conditions imply an analogous property
for I: if (a, b, c, d) ∈ I, then (a, c, b, d) ∈ I. For if (a, c, b, d) 6∈ I, then one of the two
conditions would yield (a, b, c, d) 6∈ I.
5.1 Correlation
Recall that according to the correlation criterion two goods are complements (substitutes)
if their consumption is positively (negatively) correlated. While, as we have seen, the
criterion fails Monotonicity, it satisfies a different monotonicity condition.
Scale Monotonicity
1) For any (a, b, c, d) ∈ C and (a′, b′, c′, d′) ∈ T such that c′
c
= d
′
d
, if a
′
a
≥ b′
b
, then
(a′, b′, c′, d′) ∈ C.
2) For any (a, b, c, d) ∈ S and (a′, b′, c′, d′) ∈ T such that c′
c
= d
′
d
, if a
′
a
≤ b′
b
, then
(a′, b′, c′, d′) ∈ S.
3) For any (a, b, c, d) ∈ I and (a′, b′, c′, d′) ∈ T such that c′
c
= d
′
d
, if a
′
a
> (=, <) b
′
b
, then
(a′, b′, c′, d′) ∈ C(∈ I,∈ S).
Suppose that the total time spent reading the online version (alone or together with the
print version) changes, but the time spent reading the online version alone decreases (resp.,
increases) as a proportion of the time spent reading both versions. Suppose also that the
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time left is allocated exactly in the same proportion as before between reading the print
version and not reading either version. Parts (1) and (2) of Scale Monotonicity say that if
the initial consumption pattern indicated complementarity (resp., substitutability), then
the new consumption pattern should also indicate complementarity (resp., substitutabil-
ity). Part (3) of the axiom states that if the goods are independent and joint consumption
is increased, then the goods will remain independent only if single good consumption is
rescaled by the same amount, and otherwise they will be classified in the obvious way.
In general, this version of the criterion fits situations where what is of interest is the
comparison between fractions of time or of populations engaged in certain activities. For
example, in the face of a declining trend in museum attendance, the local authority of the
introduction may judge that stronger complementarity between a park and a museum has
been revealed even after a decrease in joint consumption, provided this decrease is less
than that of attendance of the museum alone.
Theorem 2. A criterion satisfies Symmetry, Duality and Scale Monotonicity if and only
if it is the correlation criterion.
5.2 Additivity
As noted before, the additivity criterion is symmetric and monotonic. It also satisfies a
notion of duality based on the operation of exchanging Total single good consumption with
Joint consumption (with the joint consumption allocated to the two goods in proportion
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to the amounts that were consumed singly).
(T,J)-Duality For α = b
b+c
:
1) If (a, b, c, d) ∈ C, then (b+ c, αa, (1− α) a, d) ∈ S .
2) If (a, b, c, d) ∈ S, then (b+ c, αa, (1− α) a, d) ∈ C.
(T,J)-Duality says that the duality operation above transforms complementarity into sub-
stitution and viceversa. For example, if online and print newspapers are complements for
a consumer who reads both versions two thirds of the time and a single version (either
print or online) one fourth of the time, then they must be substitutes for a consumer who
reads both versions one fourth of the time and the single versions two thirds of the time.
Note that if (a′, b′, c′, d′) is a (T,J)-dual to (a, b, c, d) (in the sense that a′ = b+ c, b′ =
ab/(b+c), c′ = ac/(b+c) and d′ = d), then (a, b, c, d) is dual to (a′, b′, c′, d′) in the same way
as well. Consequently, (T,J)-Duality implies: if (a, b, c, d) ∈ I, then (a+ b, ab
a+b
, ac
a+b
, d
) ∈ I.
Also observe that (T,J)-Duality implies Responsiveness. Indeed, for any datapoint
in region C or S, (T,J)-Duality gives an operation on the first three coordinates of the
datapoint which will lead to a departure from the original region.
This notion of duality may be of relevance, for instance, for a firm considering whether
to sell goods in a bundled or separated format: from its perspective, the ‘opposite’ of a
consumption pattern is one that switches the two types of consumptions in the manner
indicated above.
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Next, consider the following variant of the Monotonicity property:
I−Monotonicity
1) If (a, b, c, d) ∈ I, (a′, b′, c′, d′) ∈ T , and a′ ≥ a, b′ + c′ ≤ b + c, with at least one of the
two inequalities strict, then (a′, b′, c′, d′) ∈ C.
2) If (a, b, c, d) ∈ I, (a′, b′, c′, d′) ∈ T , and a′ ≤ a, b′ + c′ ≥ b + c, with at least one of the
two inequalities strict, then (a′, b′, c′, d′) ∈ S.
Loosely, I−Monotonicity says that, if the goods are independent, then increasing joint
consumption while decreasing single good consumption makes them complementary. This
monotonicity property incorporates a responsiveness requirement: essentially, it implies
that the Independence area is thin, as is the case for all standard definitions of comple-
mentarity/substitutability.
With these two additional properties we can state the following:
Theorem 3. A criterion satisfies Monotonicity, I−Monotonicity and (T,J)-Duality if
and only if it is the additivity criterion.
5.3 Maxmin
The Maxmin criterion is a monotonic criterion that differs structurally from the other two
because it has a thick independence region (so that it will not satisfy I−Monotonicity).
It expresses yet a different notion of duality, according to which the choice behaviour
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opposite to a given one is defined by exchanging joint consumption with only one of the
single good consumptions.
Ideally, we would like to impose a property of the following type. Suppose that online
and print newspapers are complements for a consumer who, when he reads the print
version, also reads the online version α% of the time; then, they must be substitutes for
a consumer who, when he reads the print version, also reads the online version (1− α) %
of the time (and analogously starting from substitutability). It is a consequence of our
characterisation below that this type of duality together with Symmetry and Monotonicity
leads to another impossibility. So we use a weakened version of the property, which settles
for merely switching out of the initial region after the duality operation.
(S,J)-Duality
1) If (a, b, c, d) ∈ C then (b, a, c, d) /∈ C and (c, b, a, d) /∈ C.
2) If (a, b, c, d) ∈ S then (b, a, c, d) /∈ S and (c, b, a, d) /∈ S.
3) If (a, b, c, d) ∈ I and a 6= b (resp. a 6= c) then (b, a, c, d) /∈ I (resp. (c, b, a, d) /∈ I).
Note that, like (T,J)-Duality, (S,J)-Duality also implies Responsiveness. This notion of
duality may be of relevance, for instance, for a firm considering whether or not to include
an accessory with its main product.
Theorem 4. A criterion (C, I, S) satisfies Symmetry, (S,J)-Duality and Monotonicity if
and only if it is the maxmin criterion.
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The characterisations in theorems 2-4 show that one cannot ‘take a stance’ in the
abstract regarding the three criteria. The relative appeal of the criteria will depend on
the context where they are applied and on the objectives of the user. By singling out a
handful of characterising properties our analysis may help in this kind of evaluations by
making all the implications of each criterion transparent. Moreover, it forces an economist
to make up his mind on exactly which ‘consistency’ principles he is willing to defend when
making certain evaluations.
For example, suppose that an economist accepts, beside the symmetry of complemen-
tarity:
(1) if two online newspapers are complementary when the data show x% joint paper
readers and y% single paper readers, then they must be substitutes if the percentages x
and y were reversed.
Then our economist must also accept one the following two propositions:
(2) complementarity is indicated by the additivity criterion; or
(3) there exist datasets from which he would infer complementarity or independence
but will infer substitutability after a conversion of single paper readers to joint reading.
Also the economist cannot simultaneously accept (1), reject (3), and at the same time
defend:
(4) if two online newspapers are considered complementary for a dataset, then they
must be substitutes if the percentages of joint paper readers and readers of one of the
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papers were reversed.
The net of such logical constraints uncovered in our results is non-obvious, and under-
standing it seems important both at the theoretical and the empirical level.
6 Concluding remarks
Complementarity in general is such a central concept in Economics that its study hardly
needs to be motivated. Complementarity has deeply engaged at the theoretical level some
of the giants of the profession (see the historical overview in Samuelson (27)). Knowing
whether goods are complements or substitutes (or neither) is of major practical importance
in disparate areas: for example, suppliers must have information about complementarity
when introducing new products or when pricing existing products; so do regulators to eval-
uate the competitiveness of a market; businesses may be reluctant to change a practice
because of its complementarity with another; and so on. Finally, the concept of comple-
mentarity can be imaginatively applied in non-obvious contexts: for example, Becker and
Murphy (6) introduced the idea of assimilating the theory of advertising into the theory
of complementarity.
While statistical association is intuitively part of what it means for goods to ‘go to-
gether’ (and sheer correlation in consumption or usage data is often taken as a behavioural
indicator of complementarity), we have shown that, in general, criteria for complementar-
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ity based on statistical association alone conflict with a basic monotonicity requirement
that captures the ‘revealed preference’ aspect of complementarity. Our axiomatic analy-
sis suggests that if monotonicity is considered primarily important, then different criteria
(additivity and maxmin) may be preferable.
We have illustrated that the theoretical distinction between criteria is also relevant in
practice, since correlation, additivity and maxmin give strongly contrasting indications
using the data found in a leading application (Gentzkow (18)).
6.1 ‘True complementarity’ vs. taste correlation
One criticism that could be made of our approach runs along the following lines.10 Suppose
that we observe a daily series of online/print news consumptions for an individual at fixed
prices. Then each of our definitions will declare whether or not the two versions are com-
plements or substitutes. A definition of complementarity based on random utility, on the
other hand, will distinguish between the case in which the individual derives more utility
from joint consumption than from the sum of the utilities of single-version consumption
(‘true complementarity’), and the case in which whenever the individual wakes up in a
mood for reading online news he is also likely to be in the mood for reading the print
version - he may simply wake up sometimes in the mood for news and some other times
not in the mood for news, independently of the form in which they come (‘correlation in
10We thank Matthew Gentzkow for raising this important issue.
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taste’). Now, we could hold the choices constant and vary whether or not they indicate
‘true complementarity’ by changing the correlation in taste, whereas our definitions will
fail to record these changes. But the key point to understand here is that the kind of
complementarity we are trying to capture with our definitions is a related but separate
concept from the random utility based concept of complementarity. The latter concept is
tied to a specific assumption on the process that drives behaviour. But one could make
different assumptions. Suppose for example that behaviour was driven instead by ‘random
consideration set’ mechanisms of the type discussed in Brady and Rehbeck (11), Kovach
and U¨lku¨ (21), and Manzini and Mariotti (22)) in which preferences are deterministic but
the subset of the feasible set that is actually considered by (or available to) the agent is
random. Then we should separate ‘true complementarity’ from correlation in considera-
tion rather than from correlation in taste, as our individual’s mood is now expressed by
a shock in consideration and not by a shock in taste: he wakes up sometimes considering
both types of news media and sometimes not considering either, while always deriving
utility from either in the same way. This leads to a different identification problem and
likely to a different measurement of complementarity. If we only observe behaviour, which
of the two measurements of ‘true complementarity’ should we regard as ‘truer’?11
Our behavioural, model-free approach is designed precisely to cut through this type of
11Note that some specifications of the consideration set model can be rewritten as RUMs while others
cannot.
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modelling dilemmas. It takes choice data at face value. It serves a different purpose from
‘standard’ definitions: it suits the researcher or user who wishes to be non-committal as to
the mechanism that generates behaviour, which is treated as unknown and unknowable.
We view this approach as a complement, rather than as a substitute, of the standard one.
6.2 If you could, should you use Hicks complementarity with stochastic
choice data?
An interesting by-product of our approach is its implication that if prices were available
and consumers were utility maximisers, and therefore the standard Hicks criterion of com-
plementarity could be applied, it would conflict with Monotonicity.12 This can be quickly
seen through the following reasoning. Define Hicksian complementarity with stochastic
demand in the standard way using expected demand. Gentzkow (18) shows that, for
the simple two-good logit model, Hicksian complementarity thus defined is equivalent to
the supermodularity of the utility function. On the other hand, we have shown that the
correlation criterion fails Monotonicity.
Because Monotonicity seems such a fundamental principle, we argue that this reasoning
shows that the Hicks criterion may be ill-applied to the context of random utility. That
is, even when it could be applied because prices are available, the Hicks criterion should
not be uncritically applied to stochastic choice data. To refer to table 1 again, suppose
12We thank Jean-Pierre Dube´ for pointing this out to us.
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that the data changed from those in that table, to the following:
Read print Did not read print
Read online 0.487 0.043
Did not read online 0.447 0.023
This can mean for example that for every 1000 people, 350 of the non-readers con-
verted to reading. Each of these new readers reads both versions and none of them reads
just one version. Now the previously positive consumption correlation has turned negative
( 0.487
0.487+0.447
= 0.521 < 0.530 = 0.487 + 0.043). On the assumption that consumption is
generated by a logit random utility model, negative (resp., positive) consumption corre-
lation is, as noted before, equivalent to Hicksian substitutability (resp., complementarity)
using expected demand. But how can the conversion of over one third of the population
to reading jointly the print and the online version be taken as diagnostic of a switch from
complementarity to substitution in the nature of these goods? This seems a perverse
conclusion.
The paradoxical behaviour of the Hicks criterion in this circumstance stems from the
often neglected fact that a parameter (in this case the sign of the Hicksian elasticity) that
is meaningful in the deterministic utility model may not carry the same meaning when
applied to the perturbed utility version of the model. For an analogy, think of the fact
that the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion coefficient of a deterministic utility cannot be taken
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as a measure of risk aversion in the random utility version of the model (Apesteguia and
Ballester (2), Blavatsky (10), Wilcox (31)): in that case, an individual with a higher
Arrow-Pratt coefficient of risk aversion may be more likely to accept risk than one with
a lower coefficient. We hope that our analysis helps to reinforce the notion that the
interpretation of certain features of a utility function (such as supermodularity) is not
necessarily inherited by the stochastic version of that utility. Complementarity criteria for
stochastic choice data should, even if based on utility maximisation, address directly the
stochastic nature of the primitives.
6.3 More than two goods
Various additional complementarity questions arise if we have access to consumption fre-
quencies with more than two goods. Let X be a finite set of goods with at least three ele-
ments and suppose that consumption data comes in the form of a probability distribution
p over all subsets S of X. If we are interested in the complementarity between disjoint
sets of goods, say S and T , then we can define the following cumulative probabilities:
pST :=
∑
A:S∪T⊆A p(A), pS :=
∑
A:S⊆A, T∩A=∅ p(A), pT :=
∑
A:T⊆A, S∩A=∅ p(A) and p∅ :=∑
A:(S∪T )∩A=∅ p(A). Hence pST is the probability that all goods in S∪T are consumed (with
or without other goods) and p∅ is the probability that no good in S∪T is consumed. Now
we can use any one of the criteria we have discussed on the 4-tuple (pST , pS, pT , p∅). Like-
wise, if we are interested in the complementarity between goods x and y conditional on the
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consumption of good z, then we can use our criteria on the 4-tuple (pxy|z, px|z, py|z, p∅|z)
of conditional probabilities where pxy|z :=
(∑
A:{x,y,z}⊆A p(A)
)
/
(∑
A:z∈A p(A)
)
, px|z :=(∑
A:{x,z}⊆A, y 6∈A p(A)
)
/
(∑
A:z∈A p(A)
)
, py|z :=
(∑
A:{y,z}⊆A, x 6∈A p(A)
)
/
(∑
A:z∈A p(A)
)
and p∅|z :=
(∑
A:z∈A, x,y 6∈A p(A)
)
/
(∑
A:z∈A p(A)
)
.
A distinct possibility that arises with multiple goods is when complementarity is betwen
more than two goods. For instance, Aral et al. (3) discuss a three-way complementarity
between performance pay, human resource analytics and information technology. Our
methods can be used to capture such complementarity, say between x, y and z, by checking
that any two of the goods are complements conditional on the third good.
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Appendices
A Proofs
Theorem 1. There exists no criterion that satisfies Monotonicity, Duality and Respon-
siveness.
Proof. We start by proving:
Claim: Let (C, I, S) be a criterion that satisfies Duality and Monotonicity. If (a, b, c, d) ∈
C then (d, b, c, a) ∈ C.
To prove the Claim, suppose (a, b, c, d) ∈ C but (d, b, c, a) 6∈ C. By Monotonicity, then,
a > d. Using Duality twice on (a, b, c, d), we get (d, c, b, a) ∈ C, and using it twice on
(d, b, c, a) we get (a, c, b, d) 6∈ C. Again, by Monotonicity, d > a, a contradiction. 
Returning to the proof of the main result, suppose that a criterion (C, I, S) satisfies
Monotonicity, Duality and Responsiveness. Take p = (a, b, c, d) such that p ∈ C. Let
θ = min{a, b, c, d}, and note in particular that it must be a < 1− θ.
We will now show that for all q = (a′, b′, c′, d′) ∈ T , if d′ > 1 − θ then q ∈ C.
This contradicts Responsiveness and thus proves the impossibility. Take such a q, and
let r = (d′, b′, c′, a′). Note that b′ < θ (otherwise, if b′ ≥ θ, then d′ > 1 − b′ and thus
b′ + d′ > 1), and similarly c′ < θ. Then d′ > 1 − θ > a, b′ < θ ≤ b and c′ < θ ≤ c. By
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Monotonicity, r ∈ C and by the Claim above, we conclude that q ∈ C.
Theorem 2. A criterion satisfies Symmetry, Duality and Scale Monotonicity if and only
if it is the correlation criterion.
Proof. That the three axioms are necessarily satisfied by the correlation definition is
trivial. Suppose that a criterion (C, I, S) satisfies the three axioms. Begin by noting that
(pxy, px, py, p∅) ∈ C ⇔ pxy
pxy + py
> pxy + px
⇔ pxy (1− pxy − px − py) > pxpy
⇔ pxyp∅ > pxpy
and similarly (pxy, px, py, p∅) ∈ S ⇔ pxyp∅ < pxpy. Then, since C, I and S form a
partition, the result follows from the following three claims.
Claim 1: C ⊆ {(a, b, c, d) ∈ T : ad > bc}. Take (a, b, c, d) ∈ C and suppose towards a
contradiction that ad ≤ bc. It follows that min{a, d} ≤ max{b, c}. Symmetry and Duality
imply that w.l.o.g. we can assume d ≤ a and b ≤ c so that d ≤ c.
We will show that b < a. First note that (d, c, b, a) ∈ C by Symmetry and Duality.
By Scale Monotonicity (recall d ≤ c) (c, d, b, a) ∈ C. Now using Symmetry and Duality
again we get (a, b, d, c) ∈ C. Duality gives (b, a, c, d) ∈ S. Now if b ≥ a, applying Scale
Monotonicity, (a, b, c, d) ∈ S, a contradiction. Hence b < a as we wanted to show.
In the rest of the proof, for any q = (q1, q2, q3, q4) ∈
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R 4++, let q
∗ = 1∑4
i=1 qi
q, so that q∗ ∈ T. We have (a, ad
bc
b, c, d)∗ = (a, ad
c
, c, d)∗ ∈ C by
Scale Monotonicity since ad
bc
≤ 1. By Symmetry and Duality (d, ad
c
, c, a) ∈ C. Applying
Scale Monotonicity again, ( c
d
d, c
d
ad
c
, c, a)∗ = (c, a, c, a)∗ ∈ C. By Duality (c, a, c, a)∗ ∈ S, a
contradiction.
Claim 2: S ⊆ {(a, b, c, d) ∈ T : ad < bc}. Take (a, b, c, d) ∈ S and suppose towards a
contradiction that ad ≥ bc. It follows that min{b, c} ≤ max{a, d}. Symmetry and Duality
say that w.l.o.g. we can assume a ≤ d and c ≤ b so that c ≤ d.
We will show that a < b. First note that (d, c, b, a) ∈ S by Symmetry and Duality.
By Scale Monotonicity (recall c ≤ d) (c, d, b, a) ∈ S. Now Using Symmetry and Duality
again we get (a, b, d, c) ∈ S. Duality gives (b, a, c, d) ∈ C. Now if a ≥ b, applying Scale
Monotonicity, (a, b, c, d) ∈ C, a contradiction. Hence a < b as we wanted to show.
We have (a, ad
bc
b, c, d)∗ = (a, ad
c
, c, d)∗ ∈ S by Scale Monotonicity since ad
bc
≥ 1. By Sym-
metry and Duality (d, ad
c
, c, a) ∈ S. Applying Scale Monotonicity again, ( c
d
d, c
d
ad
c
, c, a)∗ =
(c, a, c, a)∗ ∈ S. By Duality (c, a, c, a)∗ ∈ C, a contradiction.
Claim 3: I ⊆ {ad = bc}. Take (a, b, c, d) ∈ I and suppose towards a contradiction that
ad < bc. Then set w.l.o.g. d < c and consequently, using part (3) of Scale Monotonicity in
an exact adaptation of Claim 1, a > b. The rest of the argument mirrors that in Claim 1.
Similarly follow, with the obvious necessary modifications, the proof of Claim 2 if ad > bc.
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Theorem 3. A criterion satisfies Monotonicity, I−Monotonicity and (T,J)-Duality if
and only if it is the additivity criterion.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that the additivity criterion satisfies the three axioms.
Suppose that (C, I, S) satisfies the three axioms. The result follows from the following
three claims.
Claim 1: C ⊆ {(a, b, c, d) ∈ T : a > b+ c}.
Suppose towards a contradiction that (a, b, c, d) ∈ C and a ≤ b+ c. By (T,J)-Duality,
(b+ c, ab/(b+ c), ac/(b+ c), d) ∈ S. Since a/ (b+ c) ≤ 1 this contradicts Monotonicity.
Claim 2: S ⊆ {(a, b, c, d) ∈ T : a < b+ c}.
The proof is symmetric to that of Claim 1.
Claim 3: I ⊆ {(a, b, c, d) ∈ T : a = b+ c}.
Suppose that (a, b, c, d) ∈ I but a < b+c. (T,J)-Duality yields (b+c, ab/(b+c), ac/(b+
c), d) ∈ I, which contradicts I-Monotonicity. Similarly if a > b+ c.
Theorem 4. A criterion (C, I, S) satisfies Symmetry, (S,J)-Duality and Monotonicity if
and only if is the maxmin criterion.
Proof. Necessity is easily checked. In the other direction, suppose that (C, I, S) satisfies
these three axioms. We will first show that C ⊆ {(a, b, c, d) : a > b, c}. Suppose, towards a
contradiction, that (a, b, c, d) ∈ C but a ≤ max{b, c}. By (S,J)-Duality (b, a, c, d) 6∈ C and
(c, b, a, d) 6∈ C, and this contradicts Monotonicity. Hence a > b, c. Similarly if (a, b, c, d) ∈
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S but a ≥ min{b, c}, then (S,J)-Duality yields (b, a, c, d) 6∈ S and (c, b, a, d) 6∈ S, again
contradicting Monotonicity. Hence S ⊆ {(a, b, c, d) : a < b, c}.
It remains to show that I ⊆ {min{b, c} ≤ a ≤ max{b, c}} and the proof will follow the
fact that (C, I, S) is a partition. To this end take some (a, b, c, d) ∈ I. There are three
cases to consider regarding where the dual datapoint (b, a, c, d) lies.
Case 1: (b, a, c, d) ∈ I. Then by (S,J)-Duality (part 3), a = b and therefore min{b, c} ≤
a ≤ max{b, c}.
Case 2: (b, a, c, d) ∈ S. By Monotonicity we must have a > b, giving a ≥ min{b, c}.
By Symmetry on the other hand, (a, c, b, d) ∈ I. By (S,J)-Duality applied to (b, a, c, d),
(c, a, b, d) 6∈ S. Now either (c, a, b, d) ∈ I, in which case a = c by (S,J)-Duality (part
3), or (c, a, b, d) ∈ C, in which case c > a by Monotonicity. Hence a ≤ c and therefore
a ≤ max{b, c}.
Case 3: (b, a, c, d) ∈ C. By Monotonicity b > a and therefore a ≤ max{b, c}. By
Symmetry (a, c, b, d) ∈ I. By (S,J)-Duality (c, a, b, d) 6∈ C. Either (c, a, b, d) ∈ I, in
which case a = c by (S,J)-Duality (part 3), or (c, a, b, d) ∈ S, in which case c < a by
Monotonicity. Hence a ≥ c and therefore a ≥ min{b, c}.
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B A characterisation of the supermodularity crite-
rion
T-Monotonicity For any two datapoints (a, b, c, d) and (a′, b′, c′, d′):
1. if (a, b, c, d) ∈ C and b′ + c′ ≤ b+ c, then (a′, b′, c′, d′) ∈ C
2. if (a, b, c, d) ∈ S and b′ + c′ ≥ b+ c, then (a′, b′, c′, d′) ∈ S
3. if (a, b, c, d) ∈ I and b′ + c′ < (>)b+ c, then (a′, b′, c′, d′) ∈ C(∈ S)
That is, a decrease in Total single-good consumption cannot change complements into
non-complements. Likewise, an increase in total single-good consumption cannot change
substitutes into non-substitutes.
Theorem 5. : A criterion (C, I, S) satisfies T-Monotonicity and Duality if and only if
it is the supermodularity criterion.
Proof. Necessity of the axioms is obvious. Suppose (C, I, S) satisfies the axioms. The
following three steps establish that (C, I, S) is the supermodularity criterion.
Step 1. Take (a, b, c, d) ∈ C. Suppose a+d ≤ b+ c. By T-Monotonicity, (b, a, d, c) ∈ C
which violates Duality. Hence C ⊆ {(a, b, c, d) : a+ d > b+ c}.
Step 2. Take (a, b, c, d) ∈ S. Suppose a+ d ≥ b+ c. By T-Monotonicity (b, a, d, c) ∈ S
which violates Duality. Hence S ⊆ {(a, b, c, d) : a+ d < b+ c}.
44
Step 3. Take (a, b, c, d) ∈ I. By Duality (b, a, d, c) ∈ I. If a+d < b+c, then (b, a, d, c) ∈
S by S-Monotonicity and if a + d > b + c, then (b, a, d, c) ∈ C by T-Monotonicity. Hence
a+ d = b+ c and I ⊆ {(a, b, c, d) : a+ d = b+ c}.
C Incompatibility between I−Monotonicity and Du-
ality
In this Appendix we show that I−Monotonicity and Duality are incompatible.
Theorem 6. There exists no criterion that satisfies I−Monotonicity and Duality.
Proof: Suppose that (C, I, S) satisfies the axioms. Take p = (a, a, b, b) with b > a. It
cannot be (a, a, b, b) ∈ S, for then by Duality (a, a, b, b) ∈ C, a contradiction. Similarly,
it cannot be (a, a, b, b) ∈ C. Then (a, a, b, b) ∈ I. By Duality (b, b, a, a) ∈ I. But this
contradicts I−Monotonicity.
D Monotonicity and Duality imply Symmetry
Proposition 1. If a criterion satisfies Duality and Monotonicity, then it satisfies Sym-
metry.
Proof: Suppose that a criterion (C, I, S) satisfies Duality and Monotonicity but fails
Symmetry. We consider four cases.
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Case 1: (a, b, c, d) ∈ C but (a, c, b, d) ∈ S. By Duality (b, a, d, c) ∈ S and (c, a, d, b) ∈ C.
By Monotonicity c > b. Applying Duality to the first two datapoints we get (c, d, a, b) ∈ S
and (b, d, a, c) ∈ C, and then by Monotonicity b > c, a contradiction.
Case 2: (a, b, c, d) ∈ C but (a, c, b, d) ∈ I. By Duality (b, a, d, c) ∈ S and (c, a, d, b) ∈ I.
By Monotonicity c > b. Applying Duality to the first two datapoints we get (c, d, a, b) ∈ S
and (b, d, a, c) ∈ I, and then by Monotonicity b > c, a contradiction.
Cases 3 and 4 where (a, b, c, d) ∈ S and (a, c, b, d) 6∈ S are similar.
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